FAMILY LAW-RIGHT TO DIE-VEGETATIVE PATIENT'S RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION

PERMITS

SURROGATE

DECISIONMAKER

TO TERMINATE ARTIFICIAL FEEDING-In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394,

529 A.2d 434 (1987).
An individual's right to self-determination is a long-established principle of law.' The essence of this right was succinctly
captured by Judge Cardozo: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body." 2 Equally well established is the interest of society
in the preservation of life. Perplexing issues involving law,
medicine and morality arise where these interests intersect: when
may an individual refuse life-sustaining medical treatment?
These issues are further complicated when the individuals involved are unable to speak for themselves.
In the absence of legislation, New Jersey courts have attempted to protect the rights of all individuals, competent or incompetent, by articulating principles and procedures by which
these rights may be effected.4 Recognizing the physician-patient
relationship and the emotional nature of treatment decisions, the
courts have also attempted to keep judicial intervention to a minimum in an area of law where a holding that is too broad or too
narrow would be particularly unfortunate. 5 As such, the law has
developed gradually and cautiously. The New Jersey Supreme
Court's most recent development in the "right to die" area is the
case of Nancy Ellen Jobes. In In reJobes6 the court held that the
family or close friends of a non-elderly, non-hospitalized, persistently vegetative patient may make a substituted medical judgment regarding the termination of life-sustaining treatment when
the patient did not, while competent, adequately express her attiI In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221-22 (1985). See also, Perna
v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 460-63, 457 A.2d 431, 438-40 (1983) (unauthorized touch-

ing by surgeons "violated patient's right to control his own body").
2 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1222 (1985) (quoting Schloendorffv.
Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
3 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70

N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. dnied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
4 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 344-46, 486 A.2d at 1220-2 1. For a brief discussion of
bills pending in the New Jersey State Senate, see infra note 154 and accompanying
text.

5 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 343-44, 486 A.2d at 1220.
6 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
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tude toward such treatment.7
On March 11, 1980, Nancy Ellen Jobes, a 25 year old married woman, was injured in an automobile accident and taken to
Riverside Hospital for treatment.8 Thereafter, doctors determined that her four and one-half month old fetus had died as a
result of the collision. 9 While undergoing surgery on April 2,
1980 to remove the fetus, Mrs. Jobes suffered an acute cardiopulmonary collapse' 0 that resulted in severe loss of oxygen to her
brain causing massive damage to that portion of the brain which
controls movement and thought."
She never regained
consciousness.12

Mrs. Jobes was transferred from the hospital to the Lincoln
Park Nursing and Convalescent Home on July 28, 1980. l" As of
June, 1987, her condition had not improved.' 4 Although she
could breathe without the aid of a respirator, Mrs. Jobes required
a tracheostomy tube 15 to remove the mucous that collected in her
lungs. 16 She could not swallow, speak, or make any type of
sound. 17 She was incontinent and required routine enemas for
bowel evacuation.' 8 Her muscles had atrophied, causing her
limbs to become rigid and immovable. 19 Mrs. Jobes was fed and
hydrated through a jejunostomy tube (j-tube), that was surgically
inserted directly into her small intestine through a hole in her
abdominal cavity. 20 It was this tube that her husband and guardId. at 427, 529 A.2d at 451.
Id. at 401, 529 A.2d at 437.
9 Id.
10 Brief of the Respondent-Guardian,John H.Jobes III at 6, In reJobes, 108 N.J.
394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (No. 26,041) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. Acute
cardiopulmonary collapse is a sudden but severe weakening of the heart and lungs.
See 1 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER, A-73, C53, C-215 (1986).
11Jobes, 108 N.J. at 401, 529 A.2d at 437-38.
12 Id., 529 A.2d at 438.
13 Id. at 402, 529 A.2d at 438.
14 See id.
15 A tracheostomy tube is a metal or plastic tube that is inserted into an opening
in the windpipe. 1 SCHMIDT, supra note 10, at T-109.
16 Brief of Appellant at 6, In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (No.
26,041) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
17 Jobes, 108 N.J. at 402, 529 A.2d at 438.
18 Id.
19 Id. Atrophy is a withering away of muscle tissue or some other part of the
body which can be due to inadequate blood supply to that part or injury to the
nerves which control the part. 1 SCHMIDT, supra note 10, at A-370.
20 Jobes, 108 NJ. at 402, 529 A.2d at 438. Initially, Mrs.Jobes received nutrition
and hydration intravenously, and then through the use of a nasogastric tube. Id.
Difficulties associated with the frequent removal and reinsertion of the nasogastric
7
8
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ian, John H. Jobes, III, sought to have withdrawn, despite the
2
nursing home's morally-grounded objections . 1
Subsequently, Mr. Jobes petitioned the chancery division to
order the removal of the j-tube. 2 On behalf of Mrs. Jobes, the
court appointed Richard Kahn, Esq., as guardian ad litem.23
Upon the conclusion of his inquiry, Mr. Kahn filed a report supporting Mr. Jobes' decision.2 4 The nursing home then unsuc25
cessfully moved for the appointment of a "life advocate."
The trial court concluded that it had been proved by clear
and convincing evidence that Mrs. Jobes was in a persistent vegetative state 26 with no chance of recovery, and that if she was competent, she would not want, given her condition, to be sustained
by the j-tube. 27 Although the court authorized Mr. Jobes to implement withdrawal of the j-tube, it held that the nursing home
could refuse to participate.2 8 Both Mr. Jobes and the nursing
home successfully petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for
direct certification, 29 and relief was stayed pending determination of the appeal.3 0
Although there was conflicting medical testimony,3 ' the
tube required the surgical insertion of a gastrotomy tube into Mrs. Jobes' stomach
in December of 1980. Respondent's Brief, supra note 10, at 9. In June of 1985, the
failure of the gastrotomy tube necessitated the insertion of the jejunostomy tube.
Id. Water and a pre-digested, synthetic nutritional formula were continuously
pumped through this tube. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 402, 529 A.2d at 438.
21 Jobes, 108 N.J. at 400 & n.l, 529 A.2d at 437 & n.1. Mr. Jobes had been appointed the guardian of his wife during a prior malpractice action. Id.
22

23
24

Id.
Id.
Id.

25 In reJobes, 210 N.J. Super. 543, 548, 510 A.2d 133, 136 (Ch. Div. 1986), aff'd,
108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
26 Dr. Fred Plum, an expert on the vegetative state and the creator of that term,
explained at trial:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms
of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart
beat and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or
awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.
Jobes, 108 N.J. at 403, 529 A.2d at 438.
27 Id. at 400, 529 A.2d at 437.
28 Id. at 400-01, 529 A.2d at 437.
29 In reJobes, 105 N.J. 532, 523 A.2d 173 (1986).
30 Jobes, 108 N.J. at 401, 529 A.2d at 437.
3' See id. at 402-07, 529 A.2d at 438-40. Neurologists Dr. Daniel J. Carlin and
Dr. Henry R. Liss examined Mrs. Jobes in the nursing home on two occasions at the
request of her husband and family. Respondent's Brief, supra note 10, at 7. They
concluded that she was "in a chronic vegetative state characterized by a lack of
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Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the trial court's finding
that the evidence proved clearly and convincingly that Mrs. Jobes
was in a persistent vegetative state.32 The New Jersey Supreme
Court observed, however, that since there was no clear and convincing proof of Mrs. Jobes' attitude toward her life-sustaining
treatment, her family members were the proper parties to decide
on her behalf, based on their best judgment as to how she would
have decided under the circumstances.3 3 Additionally, the court
held that the nursing home could not discharge Mrs. Jobes if her
family refused to consent to artificial feeding, because it would be
very difficult to locate another health care facility that would accept her as a patient, and this would effectively deny Mrs. Jobes
her right to self-determination. 34
The right to die is not, in and of itself, a constitutional
right.35 At common law, attempting suicide was a crime,36 and
New Jersey law currently provides for the temporary hospitalization of a person who attempts suicide.37 Courts have held, howcognitive sapient awareness of self or surroundings and with no chance of her ever
attaining a cognitive sapient state again." Id. At the request of the nursing home,
Mrs.Jobes was examined by Dr. Maurice Victor and Dr. Alan H. Ropper. Jobes, 108
N.J. at 404, 529 A.2d at 439. Dr. Victor concluded that although Mrs. Jobes had
sustained severe and irreversible brain damage, her condition could not be categorized as a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 405, 529 A.2d at 439. Dr. Ropper similarly concluded that her condition fell "slightly outside of [his] operational
definition of the persistent vegetative state." Id. at 405-06, 529 A.2d at 439-40.
Both of their conclusions were based upon an alleged elicitation of activities from
Mrs. Jobes by verbal commands and reactions to stimuli. See id. Mrs. Jobes was
then admitted to the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center where she was
extensively examined over a four-day period by Dr. Fred Plum and Dr. David E.
Levy. Id. at 402-04, 529 A.2d at 438-39. The findings of Drs. Plum and Levy confirmed the conclusions of Drs. Liss and Carlin. See id. While all of Mr. Jobes' medical experts observed the movements reported by Drs. Ropper and Victor, they
concluded that these were reflexes or random movements, rather than volitional
responses. Id. at 406, 529 A.2d at 440.
32 Id. at 408, 529 A.2d at 441. Clear and convincing evidence is that which:
produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so
clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the fact finder] to
come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue.
Id. at 407-08, 529 A.2d at 441. (quoting State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 376, 471 A.2d
389, 393 (1984) (citations omitted)).
33 Id. at 420, 529 A.2d at 447.
34 Id. at 425-26, 529 A.2d at 450.
35 John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 580, 279 A.2d 670,
672 (1971).
36 Id.
37 Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-26.3a (West 1981). From 1957 to 1972, attempted suicide was a disorderly persons offense. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-25.6
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ever, that the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment
vests within other constitutional and common law rights. 8 Additionally, some states have enacted laws that recognize a qualified
right to refuse treatment, even when the result of the refusal will
be death. 9 In those states lacking both statutes and case law on
the subject, the laws of informed consent 40 may provide grounds
for refusing treatment. 4 I Regardless of its basis, a patient's right
to refuse treatment is not absolute.4 2 Rather, it is limited by four
generally recognized societal interests: the preservation of life,
the prevention of suicide, the protection of the integrity of the
medical profession, and the protection of innocent third
parties.4 3
In 1971, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston 44 that a person may be compelled to submit to life-saving medical treatment. 45 Delores Heston, a twenty-two year old unmarried woman, was injured in an
automobile accident and admitted to the hospital. 46 Doctors determined that death was imminent and that saving her life would
require surgery and blood transfusions. 47 For religious reasons,
consent to the transfusions was withheld.48 The hospital then
(West 1985). Prior to 1957, it was considered a crime under
§ 2A:85-1. See also Heston, 58 N.J. at 580, 279 A.2d at 672.
38 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (right
F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
of religion). As ofJuly 1985, 11 states have case law recognizing

N.J. STAT. ANN.
to privacy);John
(1971) (freedom
this right. Soci-

ETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE HOPELESSLY ILL PATIENT 19

(1985).
39 SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 38, at 19. As ofJuly 1985, 35 states
and the" District of Columbia have enacted such laws. Id.
40 Informed consent is "[a] person's agreement to allow something to happen
...that is based on a full disclosure of facts needed to make the decision intelligently." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 701 (5th ed. 1979). Notably, medical treatment
performed without consent is a tort. Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 NJ. 446, 461-62, 457 A.2d
431, 439 (1983).
41 SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 38, at 19. But see John F. Kennedy
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (if consent is withheld, state's interest
in preserving life may warrant appointment of guardian with authority to consent).
42 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
43 Id. at 348-49, 486 A.2d at 1223 (citations omitted).
44 58 NJ. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
45 Id. at 584-85, 279 A.2d at 674.
46 Id. at 578, 279 A.2d at 671.
47 Id.
48 Id. Miss Heston was aJehovah's Witness, a faith which forbids blood transfu-

sions.
fusion
arrival
ented.

Id. Miss Heston recalled that she explicitly refused to accept a blood transbut the evidence presented at trial indicated that she was in shock upon
at the hospital, and shortly thereafter she became incoherent and disoriId. Miss Heston's mother refused to consent on her behalf. Id.
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successfully sought the court appointment of a guardian with express authority to consent to blood transfusi6ns as needed.4 9
Although she recovered and was subsequently discharged from
the hospital, Miss Heston moved to vacate the court order. 50 After the trial court's denial of her motion but prior to argument in
the appellate division, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted
certification. 5
The court held that although religious beliefs are absolute,
an individual's conduct pursuant to those beliefs may be restrained.5 2 In the case of a terminally ill patient, the court maintained that unless the medical option was itself laden with grave
risk, a decision to let the illness run its fatal course would conflict
with the state's interests in preserving life and preventing suicide. 5 3 The court also noted that the hospital and staff had an
interest in pursuing their responsibilities in accordance with their
professional standards and permitting them to do so furthered
the state's interest in preserving life. 54 Thus, the court concluded that since the dangers associated with the medical procedure were minimal in this case, the interests of the state, hospital
and staff warranted the transfusion over the patient's
objections.
In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court expanded the principles espoused by the Heston court in the landmark case of In re
Quinlan.5 6 In that case, Joseph Quinlan sought to be appointed
the guardian of his twenty-one year old daughter Karen, who was
in a persistent vegetative state.5 7 He requested the express authority to terminate the use of the respirator that was maintaining
her vital functions. 58 Mr. Quinlan urged that through the doctrine of substituted judgment, the court could effectuate Karen's
best interests by granting the relief he sought.5 9 He also claimed
49 Id. at 579, 279 A.2d at 671.
50

Id.

51 Id. Although the controversy was moot, the Supreme Court of New Jersey

determined that the public interest nonetheless warranted resolution of the issue.
Id. (citation omitted).
52 Id. at 580, 279 A.2d at 672 (citations omitted).
53 See id. at 582, 279 A.2d at 673.
54 Id. at 583,279 A.2d at 673.
55 See id. at 582, 584-85, 279 A.2d at 673, 674.
56 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
57 In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 236, 348 A.2d 801, 806 (Ch. Div. 1975),
rev'd, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). For a definition of "persistent vegetative
state," see supra note 26.
58 Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. at 236, 348 A.2d at 806.
59 Id. at 251, 348 A.2d at 814.
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that Karen had, by virtue of her constitutional right to privacy, a
right to self-determination that would encompass a decision to
cease the continuance of extraordinary life-sustaining measures. 6 0 The defendants, relying on Heston, asserted that there is
no constitutional right to die and cited the state's interests in preserving life and protecting the integrity of the medical profession. 6 ' They also maintained that by all medical and legal
standards Karen was alive, and to disconnect the respirator
would be homicide and euthanasia.62
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Hughes,
the court held that the constitutional right to privacy encompassed a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment under the
circumstances.6 3 The court distinguished Heston by stating that
Delores Heston was capable of resuming a normal and healthy
life, while Karen Quinlan was not.' Thus, the court concluded
that there was no stat interest sufficient to compel Karen to submit to medical treatment that would not heal her, but merely prolong her slow deterioration and inevitable death.65 Because
Karen was incompetent and her supposed choice regarding treatment could not be determined, the court reasoned that the only
way to effectively preserve her right of privacy would
be to permit
66
her guardian to exercise that right on her behalf.
Since the focal point of the decision was the prognosis regarding the patient's probable return to a cognitive and sapient
state, the court sought to relieve treating physicians from selfprotection concerns that might inhibit the free exercise of their
60 Id. As additional grounds for withdrawing treatment, Mr. Quinlan asserted
the constitutional rights of freedom of religion and protection against cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. The court dismissed both arguments. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at
35-38, 355 A.2d at 661-62.
61 See Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. at 251, 348 A.2d at 814. The defendants were
Karen's doctors, the hospital, the county prosecutor, her guardian ad litem and the
State of NewJersey. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 18-19, 355 A.2d at 651.
62 Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. at 251, 348 A.2d at 814.
63 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663 (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
64 Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
65 See id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. The court stated, "[wie think that the [s]tate's
interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of
bodily invasion [associated with the medical treatment] increases and the prognosis
dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the
[s]tate interest." Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
66 Id. The court held that the basis of the decision should be whether, in the
best judgment of the family and guardian, Karen would have exercised the right
under these circumstances. Id.
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medical judgments in these cases. 67 As such, the court held that
once the attending physicians have concluded that there is no
reasonable hope for the patient's return to a cognitive, sapient
life and that withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is appropriate, they should notify the hospital's ethics committee 68 or simi-

lar consultative body. 69 If the ethics committee concurs in the
prognosis and the treating physicians, family and guardian of the
patient agree treatment should be withdrawn, the court concluded that the decision may be implemented without liability to
any participant.70
The principles articulated in Quinlan were applied to a different situation in the 1978 case of In re Quackenbush.7 ' Robert
Quackenbush was a seventy-two year old patient at Morristown
Memorial Hospital. 72 As a result of an advanced gangrenous
condition, doctors determined that amputation of both legs and
73
other medical treatment were required to sustain his life.
When Quackenbush refused to consent, the hospital petitioned
the Morris County Court to appoint a guardian with the authority
to consent to the operation.7 ' The hospital, relying on Heston,
argued that withholding consent was tantamount to suicide and
asserted that the state had a compelling interest in preventing a
patient from refusing vital medical treatment. 75 Relying on Quinlan, Quackenbush asserted his rights to privacy and selfId. at 49, 51, 355 A.2d at 668, 669.
The court observed that an ethics committee, consisting of doctors, theologians, social workers, and attorneys, would provide a forum for input and dialogue
to review the circumstances of ethical dilemma in individual situations. Id. at 49,
355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law
Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 8-9 (1975)).
69 Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. The court also granted Mr. Quinlan the authority
to replace Karen's attending physicians with others that would share his view regarding termination of treatment. See id.
70 Id.
71 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978).
72 Id. at 283, 383 A.2d at 786.
67

68

73 Id.
74 Id. Initially, the hospital alleged that Quackenbush was mentally incompetent

and petitioned for the appointment of a guardian. Id. After the court appointed a
guardian ad litem, Quackenbush filed an answer in which he asserted his competency. Id. After hearing testimony on the issue, the court concluded that Quackenbush was competent. Id. at 288, 383 A.2d at 788.
75 Id., 383 A.2d at 788-789 (citing John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v Heston,
58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971)). The court noted that "[t]he probability of recovery from the amputation [was] good and the risks involved were limited." Id. at
286, 383 A.2d at 787.
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determination. 76
The court distinguished Heston in the same way as the Quinlan court, stating that "Mr. Quackenbush [was] confronted with a
significant bodily invasion and [did] not have the long life and
vibrant health potential" of Delores Heston. 7 7 The court observed that the Quinlan decision suggested the need for both a
dim prognosis and a significant bodily invasion before an individual's right to privacy would overcome the state's interest in preserving life. 78 The court concluded that the degree of bodily
invasion in this case was so great that the state's interest in preprivacy interest,
serving life had to yield to Mr. Quackenbush's
79
regardless of the lack of a dim prognosis.
In 1985, the case of In re Conroy, s° the Supreme Court of New
Jersey confronted the issue of whether life-sustaining treatment
may be withdrawn from an institutionalized, incompetent, elderly
patient with a limited life expectancy and severe and irreversible
mental and physical impairments. 8 ' Claire Conroy was an eightyfour year old, bedridden, nursing home resident who suffered
from organic brain syndrome, arteriosclerotic heart disease, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, a gangrenous leg, and severe bed
sores.8 2 She was incontinent and had an eye condition that required irrigation.8 3 Ms. Conroy could not speak, and when her
ability to swallow deteriorated to the point where she was unable
to consume sufficient quantities of food and water to sustain herself, a nasogastric feeding tube was inserted.8 4 Although her intellectual capacity was severely and permanently impaired, she
could interact with her environment to a very limited degree and
she was not comatose, brain dead or in a persistent vegetative
state."s Thomas C. Whittemore, Conroy's guardian,86 nephew
76 Id. at 288, 383 A.2d at 789 (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1976)).
77 Id. at 288-290, 383 A.2d at 789 (discussing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647 (1976);John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971)).
78 Id. at 290, 383 A.2d at 789 (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1976)).
79 Id.
80 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
81 Id. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1216.
82 Id. at 335, 336, 337, 486 A.2d at 1216, 1217.
83 Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.
84 Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1216.
85 See id. at 337-38, 486 A.2d at 1217. One doctor who examined Ms. Conroy
"characterized her as awake, but... severely demented .... unable to respond to
verbal stimuli," and incapable of higher functioning or consciousness. Id. at 338,
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and only living relative, petitioned the court for authorization to
Conroy's guardian ad litem opposed
remove the feeding tube.
8
the petition.
The court held that Conroy's common law right to self-determination would, in these circumstances, embrace a decision to
have the feeding tube withdrawn and would not be outweighed
by any countervailing societal interest in preservation of life or
protection of the integrity of the medical profession. 8 9 The court
stated that the goal of substitute decisionmaking for an incompetent patient is to effectuate what the patient, if competent, would
have decided.9 0 In view of this, the court articulated a subjective
standard: "life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent patient when it is clear that the particular patient would have refused the treatment under the
circumstances involved."9 "
The court recognized that in some cases the patient's desires
486 A.2d at 1217. In contrast, another physician testified that although Ms. Conroy
was unaware and confused, "she respond[ed] somehow." Id.
86 Id. at 335-36, 486 A.2d at 1216. Mr. Whittemore was appointed Ms. Conroy's
guardian in 1979 when she became periodically confused due to an organic brain
syndrome. Id. at 336, 486 A.2d at 1216.
87 Id. at 335-36, 486 A.2d at 1216. Although doctors testified that if the tube
was removed, a painful death would result in approximately one week, they could
not agree upon whether Ms. Conroy was able to experience pain. Id. at 338, 486
A.2d at 1217.
88 Id. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1216. On January 26, 1983, JohnJ. DeLaney, Jr. was
appointed Ms. Conroy's guardian ad litem. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 526,
457 A.2d 1232, 1234 (Ch. Div. 1983).
89 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 355, 486 A.2d at 1226. The court characterized the essence
of the right of self-determination as follows: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body
Id. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1222 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York
....
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). The court expressly declined
to determine whether the constitutional right of privacy would encompass a decision to withdraw the feeding tube. Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223. Accord In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S. 2d 266, 272-73, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981). Cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978).
90 Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229. The court stated that "[i]deally, both aspects of
the patient's right to bodily integrity-the right to consent to medical intervention
and the right to refuse it-should be repeated. Id.
91 Id. The court overruled that portion of its decision in Quinlan that disregarded evidence of the patient's statements concerning prolonging the lives of
those who were terminally ill. Id. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230. Rather, the court held
that all types of evidence bearing upon the patient's intent were appropriate considerations regarding what treatment the patient would have desired including written documents, oral directives, reactions to the medical treatment of others,
religious beliefs, and consistent behavior patterns regarding prior medical care. Id.
at 361-62, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
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cannot be clearly determined.9 2 For such cases, the court posited
two "best interests" tests, the first of which was a "limited-objective" test. 93 Under this test, medical treatment may be withdrawn
or withheld from an incompetent patient if "there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused the treatment, and the decision-maker is satisfied that it is clear that the
burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life for him. 94 The second "best interests" test, a pure-objective standard, would be used when there is
no evidence that the patient would have refused treatment. 95
Under this test, treatment may be withdrawn or withheld if the
burdens of life with treatment significantly outweigh life's benefits and administering life-sustaining treatment would cause the
patient severe, recurring and inhumane suffering. 96
The court stressed that for any of the tests to apply, there
must be clear medical evidence that the patient is similar to
Claire Conroy: "an elderly, incompetent nursing-home resident
with permanent and severe physical and mental impairments and
a life expectancy of approximately one year or less." 9 7 Recognizing the particular vulnerability of incompetent, elderly nursing
home residents, the court required that the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly be notified prior to
the contemplated action, and that the ombudsman, after performing an investigation, concur in the decision to withdraw or
92 Id. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231. The court recognized that in such cases the
patient's right to self-determination could not realistically provide the basis for substituted decisionmaking. Id. Since incompetents are wards of the state, the court
noted that the state's parens patriae power would allow the court to authorize a
guardian "to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent
patient if it is manifest that such action would further the patient's best interests."
Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231.
93 Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
94 Id., 486 A.2d at 1232. The court clarified this further by stating:
By this we mean that the patient is suffering, and will continue to suffer
throughout the expected duration of his life, unavoidable pain, and that
the net burdens of his prolonged life (the pain and suffering of his life
with the treatment less the amount and duration of pain that the patient
would likely experience if the treatment were withdrawn) markedly outweigh any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction that the patient may still be able to derive from life.
Id.
95 Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
96 Id. The court added that "even in the context of severe pain, life-sustaining
treatment should not be withdrawn from an incompetent patient who had previously expressed a wish to be kept alive in spite of any pain that he might experience." Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232.
97 Id. at 363, 365, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
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withhold treatment from the patient. 98 In Ms. Conroy's case, the
court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to permit
withdrawal of the feeding tube under any of the tests. 99
Despite the court's restriction of its holding to patients who
are similar to Ms. Conroy, the chancery division subsequently applied the Conroy tests in distinguishable cases.' 00 In re Visbeck 101
concerned the surgical implantation of a feeding tube into the
stomach of an incompetent, ninety year-old, hospitalized woman
who had suffered a severe stroke. 0 2 The trial court observed
that although Conroy was not applicable to hospitalized patients,
"[a] NewJersey trial court judge is obliged to give close attention
to the views expressed by the [New Jersey] Supreme Court in
Conroy and to reflect upon them conscientiously in deciding cases
which are broadly similar."'' 0 3 Finding none of the Conroy tests
satisfied, the court held that the feeding tube should be
implanted.'0 4
Approximately two months after Visbeck, the Conroy holding
0 5
was again applied expansively in the case of In re Clark.
98 Id. at 381, 383-84, 486 A.2d at 1240, 1241-42. Pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27G-7.2a (West 1986), the court stated that the ombudsman would respond to
the notification as a potential abuse of the elderly, institutionalized patient requiring an investigation and report within 24 hours to the Commissioner of Human
Services and the facility's regulating agency. Id.
99 Id. 385-87, 486 A.2d at 1242-43. The court did not remand the case for further proceedings because Claire Conroy had passed away. Id. at 388, 486 A.2d at
1244. Justice Handler concurred in the majority's articulation of the moral dilemma which faced the court, but dissented from its solution. Id. at 389, 486 A.2d
at 1244 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He maintained that
by giving determinative weight to personal pain, the best interests tests negated
many other relevant factors, and therefore denied relief to people who may
strongly object to an artificial prolongation of life despite the lack of pain. Id. at
395, 486 A.2d at 1248 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
contended that a more appropriate standard, would consider the factors that shape
moral values and weigh and balance these factors from the patient's point of view.
Id. at 399, 486 A.2d at 1250 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100 In re Farrell, 212 N.J. Super. 294, 514 A.2d 1342 (Ch. Div. 1986), aff'd, 108
N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Clark, 210 N.J. Super. 548, 510 A.2d 136 (Ch.
Div. 1986); In re Visbeck, 210 N.J. Super. 527, 510 A.2d 125 (Ch. Div. 1986).
101 210 N.J. Super. 527, 510 A.2d 125 (Ch. Div. 1986).
102 Id. at 529, 510 A.2d at 126. "As a result of the stroke, Mrs. Visbeck lost much
of her mental capacity, was paralyzed on the right side, was unable to speak, became incontinent ...could not walk and lost the ability to swallow food or fluids."
Id. at 530, 510 A.2d at 126-27. The litigation arose when Mrs. Visbeck's son refused to consent to the surgical implantation of a life-sustaining feeding tube. Id. at
531, 510 A.2d at 127.
103 Id. at 533-34, 510 A.2d at 128.
104 See id. at 534-42, 510 A.2d at 129-33.
105 210 N.J. Super. 548, 510 A.2d 136 (Ch. Div. 1986).
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George Clark was a forty-five year old, incompetent, hospitalized
man who suffered from organic brain damage and partial paralysis due to a stroke.' 0 6 When Clark was no longer able to swallow
food and water, the hospital sought authorization to perform a
life-saving enterostomy.'0 7 Unlike the individuals in Conroy and
Visbeck, Mr. Clark had an indefinite life-expectancy with the proposed treatment because his other medical problems were not
life-threatening.'
The trial court acknowledged that Mr.
Clark's medical condition did "not place him squarely within the
Quinlan or the Conroy categories."'109 Nonetheless, the court determined that the situations of Mr. Clark and Mrs. Conroy were
sufficiently comparable to justify the application of the Conroy
standards."1 0 Finding none of these tests satisfied, the court held
that the enterostomy should be performed."'
Shortly after Clark, the inauspicious situation of Nancy Ellen
Jobes arose.' 2 Since Mrs. Jobes was under the age of sixty, the
106 Id. at 550, 510 A.2d at 137. Although his cognitive level was very low, Mr.
Clark was not comatose. Id.
107 Id. An enterostomy is a permanent, surgical opening of the intestine through
the abdominal wall, similar to a colostomy. SCHMIDT, supra note 10, at E-92.
108 Clark, 210 NJ. Super. at 550, 510 A.2d at 137.
109 Id. at 553, 510 A.2d at 138.
110 Id. at 553-54, 510 A.2d at 139 (citing In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976)).
''t Id. at 566, 510 A.2d at 146.
112 Decided the same day as In reJobes were the cases of In re Farrell, 108 NJ.
335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987) and In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987). Farrell concerned the right of a competent, thirty-seven year-old, terminally-ill patient
living at home to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 341, 529 A.2d
at 407. The court noted that although Quinlan and Conroy concerned incompetent,
institutionalized patients, those cases recognized a competent patient's rights, subject to countervailing societal interest, to give an informed refusal to medical treatment. Id. at 344, 529 A.2d at 408 (citing In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 101, 355 A.2d 647 (1976)). The court held that those
state interests, as interpreted in Conroy, did not outweigh Mrs. Farrell's rights of
privacy and self-determination. Id. at 348-49, 529 A.2d at 410-11 (citing In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985)). To assist in future cases, the court set
forth the following procedure to apply to competent, terminally-ill patients, living
at home who chose to forego life-sustaining treatment: first, it must be shown that
the patient is competent, fully informed regarding the prognosis, the risk of foregoing treatment, and alternate courses of treatment; second, it must be determined
that the patient's decision was voluntarily made; third, this finding must be confirmed by two non-attending physicians; lastly, the patient's right must be balanced
against the four countervailing state interests. Id. at 353-54, 356, 529 A.2d at 413,
415.
The Peter case involved a sixty-five year old resident of a nursing home in a
persistent vegetative state but who did not have a limited life expectancy. Peter, 108
N.J. at 370, 529 A.2d at 421-22. Ms. Peter's friend and guardian sought to remove
her life-sustaining nasogastric tube. Id.at 370-71, 529 A.2d at 422. The court held
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ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly lacked jurisdiction
to consider her case, 1 3 and unlike Claire Conroy, Mrs. Jobes had
an indefinite life-expectancy." 14 Nonetheless, the trial court determined that the evidence showed clearly and convincingly that
Mrs. Jobes would have refused treatment under the circumstances, and thus held that the Conroy limited-objective test had
15
been satisfied and authorized the removal of the feeding tube.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the trial court's authorization, but did so for substantially different reasons.' 16
Writing for the Jobes majority, Justice Garibaldi noted that
cases involving patients in a persistent vegetative state presented
unique decisionmaking problems." 7 Thus, the majority asserted
that these cases had to be distinguished from cases involving
other types of patients." 8 Accordingly, the court held that unless
a persistently vegetative patient had clearly expressed his or her
intentions regarding treatment,' 9 Quinlan should provide the
20
guiding principles.

that the evidence, including Ms. Peter's execution of a durable power of attorney
authorizing her friend to make medical decisions on her behalf, satisfied the Conroy
subjective test and permitted withdrawal of the feeding tube. Id. at 378, 380, 529
A.2d at 426, 427. The court also held that the Conroy subjective test was "applicable in every surrogate-refusal-of-treatment case, regardless of the patient's medical
condition or life-expectancy." Id. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425. The court asserted,
however, that the Conroy limited-objective and pure-objective tests should not be
applied to cases involving patients in persistent vegetative states because such patients "do not experience any of the benefits or burdens that the Conroy balancing
tests are intended or able to appraise." Id. at 376-77, 529 A.2d at 425. The court
noted that if a hospitalized patient in a persistent vegetative state has not clearly
indicated his or her intentions regarding treatment, the Quinlan procedures should
be applied. Id. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425.
113 In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 422, 529 A.2d 434, 448 (1987).
' 14 See id. at 454, 529 A.2d at 465 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
115 See id. at 400, 529 A.2d at 437; Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 18.
116 SeeJobes, 108 N.J. at 428, 529 A.2d at 452.
117 Id. at 413, 529 A.2d at 443. ChiefJustice Wilentz and Justice Stein joined in
Justice Garibaldi's opinion. Id. at 454, 529 A.2d at 465. Justice Clifford joined in
the separate concurring opinions of Justice Handler and Pollock, and Justice
O'Hern filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
118 Id. at 413, 529 A.2d at 443.
119 If a patient in a persistent vegetative state had clearly expressed his or her
intentions regarding treatment, the Conroy subjective test should be applied. See
supra note 112 (discussing In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987)).
120 SeeJobes, 108 N.J. at 413, 529 A.2d at 443. Although Quinlan involved the
removal of a respirator, the court affirmed the position taken in Conroy that there is
no meaningful distinction between the withdrawal of a nasogastric feeding tube and
withdrawal of other life-sustaining medical treatment. Id. at 413 n.9, 529 A.2d at
444 n.9. Notably, however, Mr. Quinlan never sought to remove Karen's feeding
tube. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 462 n.5, 464 A.2d, 303, 307 n.5 (App. Div.
1983) (citing Ramsey, Prolonged Dying: Not Medically Indicated, 6 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
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The court affirmed its determination in Quinlan that the only
way to preserve the rights of incompetent patients to decline
treatment would be to permit surrogate decisionmakers to
render their best judgment as to what the patients would have
wanted under the circumstances. 12 ' The court emphasized as it
had in Quinlan, "that a patient's family members [are] the proper
parties to make a substituted medical judgment," because they
are better acquainted with the patient's general opinions and
medical attitudes. 122 The court asserted that the patient's parents, spouses, siblings or adult children would typically be close
enough to effect substituted judgment. 23 The court acknowledged, however, that on some occasions the patient may not have
close family, or the patient's family may not act in the patient's
best interest. 24 In these cases, the court asserted that a guardian
must be appointed prior to the termination of life-supporting
treatment.1 25 Because Mrs. Jobes was fortunate enough to have a
caring family, the court
asserted that there was no reason to dis26
turb their decision.1

TheJobes majority noted the Quinlan court's requirement that
a hospital prognosis committee must concur in the patient's
127
prognosis before the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
Although Mrs. Jobes was a resident of a nursing home rather
than a hospital patient, the majority stated that location should
not affect the patient's right to self-determination.' 28 Therefore,
the court reasoned that in the case of a non-hospitalized, nonelderly, persistently vegetative patient, the concurrence of two
independent neurolgical physicians in the patient's prognosis
would effectively substitute for the opinion of the hospital prog14 (1976)). When asked if he would want the tube removed, he reportedly stated in
amazement, "Oh no. That is her nourishment." Id.
121 Jobes, 108 N.J. at 414, 529 A.2d at 444 (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41,
355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976)).
122 Id. at 415, 529 A.2d at 444-45.
123 Id. at 419, 529 A.2d at 447. The court noted that a distant relative may "be
treated as a close and caring family member" if health care professionals find that
that person functions as part of the patient's nuclear family. Id.
124 Jobes, 108 N.J. at 419, 529 A.2d at 447. The assessment as to the improper
motivations of a patient's family members is to be made by the health care professionals, who will not be held liable for incorrect determinations made in good faith.
Id.
125 Id
126 Id. at 419-20, 529 A.2d at 447.
127 Id. at 420-21, 529 A.2d at 447-48.
128 Id. at 421, 529 A.2d at 448.
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nosis committee.' 29 This requirement, the court noted, would
maintain the procedural safeguards against inappropriate withdrawal of treatment established by Quinlan, without unduly bur130
dening the patient's rights to privacy and self-determination.
In the instant case, the court concluded that the testimony of Mr.
Jobes' neurological experts provided the required concurrence in
the prognosis that Mrs. Jobes was in an irreversibly vegetative
condition. 131
The court also ruled that because the nursing home had
failed to inform the Jobes family of its policy not to participate in
the withholding or withdrawal of artificial feeding until the family
requested the removal of the j-tube, the nursing home could not
discharge Mrs. Jobes if her family refused to consent to artificial
feeding. 3 2 The majority reasoned that in light of the difficulty of
finding another facility to accept Mrs. Jobes, allowing the nursing
home to enforce its policy would frustate Mrs. Jobes' right to
self-determination. 133
In a separate opinion, Justice Handler concurred in both the
majority's reasoning and result. 134 The justice expressed concern, however, over the "inevitable uncertainty" surrounding the
use of self-determination as the basis for a medical treatment decision on behalf of an incompetent. 35 Justice Handler maintained that the court should provide guidelines for
decisionmaking when excessive doubt rendered the self-determination rationale illusory.1 36 Justice Handler suggested that a
court should consult with the persons frequently involved in decisions regarding life and death so that a "best interest" or "objective" standard for decisionmaking could be developed for
129 Id. at 421-22, 529 A.2d at 448. For patients at least sixty years old, the Office
of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly must concur in the decision to
terminate life support. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 379-84, 486 A.2d at 1239-42. See also
NJ. STAT. ANN. 52:27G-1 to -G16 (West 1986).
130 Jobes, 108 N.J. at 427, 529 A.2d at 451.
131 Id. at 409, 529 A.2d at 441.
132 Id. at 425, 529 A.2d at 450. The court specifically declined to decide whether
a nursing home that gives notice of its policy at the time of the patient's admission
would be permitted to enforce such a policy. Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 428, 529 A.2d at 452 (Handler, J., concurring).

Id. at 436-37, 529 A.2d at 455-56 (Handler, J., concurring).
Id. at 437, 529 A.2d at 456 (Handler,J., concurring). When such doubt exists,
the self-determination approach is an "imaginative effort" on the part of the decisionmaker, expressing "concerns and sympathy for the patient, rather than actually
divining that person's unknown wishes." Id. at 439, 529 A.2d at 457 (Handler, J.,
concurring) (quoting Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe,
18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 933, 972-73 (1985)).
135
136
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those situations in which a self-determination standard is
inappropriate. 3 7
Justice Pollock authored a separate opinion in which he con38
curred with the opinions of the majority and Justice Handler.
Justice Pollock urged that health care facilities make available the
services of institutional ethics committees to provide advice to
patients, families and physicians who are trying to make educated
and informed treatment decisions.' 39 The ethics committee, as
envisioned by Justice Pollock, differed from the Quinlan prognosis committee in that the former's function would be to educate
and advise on all aspects of terminating life-sustaining treatment,
as opposed to only reviewing the patient's prognosis. 4 °
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Hern criticized the majority for espousing principles that were "based upon the intact family status" and maintained that the court should instead adopt
principles that are applicable in all circumstances.' 4 ' Concerned
with compelling health-care professionals to act contrary to their
medical standards, Justice O'Hern advanced that the court may
frustrate the privacy interests of these professionals. 14 2 Lastly,
Justice O'Hern maintained that the majority's holding was conin that the evidence did not satisfy any of the Contrary to Conroy
43
roy tests.'
Recognizing the dangers of an overbroad ruling, the court
has attempted to confine its right-to-die decisions to narrowly
drawn factual circumstances. 44 This inevitably results in cases
whose varying factual circumstances preclude the application of
established procedural safeguards to the patients involved. Such
was the case of Nancy Ellen Jobes, whose location and age did
not afford her the protections established in Quinlan and Conroy 14 5 Building primarily upon the foundation laid in Quinlan,
137 Id. at 444-45, 529 A.2d at 460 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler indicated that such persons should include doctors and health care professionals, government and institutional representatives, such as persons with ethical and
religious training. Id. at 444, 529 A.2d at 460.
138 Id. at 447, 529 A.2d at 461 (Pollock, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 450, 529 A.2d at 463 (Pollock, J., concurring).
140 See id. at 450-53, 529 A.2d at 463-64 (Pollock, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 453, 529 A.2d at 464 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
142 Id. Justice O'Hern stated that the Quinlan standard, which permitted the nonconsenting physician to withdraw from the case, was more appropriate. Id. at 45354, 529 A.2d at 464-65 (O'Hern,J., dissenting) (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647 (1976)).
143 Id. at 454, 529 A.2d at 465 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
144 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 343-44, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985).
145 SeeJobes, 108 N.J. at 420-22, 529 A.2d at 447-48.
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the court observed that patients like Mrs. Jobes would be adequately protected by requiring the concurrence of two independent physicians in the patient's prognosis before life-sustaining
treatment may be withheld or withdrawn.' 46
While this may prevent a life-support decision based upon a
premature or inaccurate prognosis, it does not prevent a life-support decision based upon the improper motivations of the surrogate decisionmaker. The court did not provide for independent
review of the surrogate's judgment as to what the patient would
have decided under the circumstances. Though the court required that a guardian should be appointed when health care
professionals suspect improper motivations, the court offered no
guidance as to how such determinations are to be made. Rather,
the court simply stated that health care professionals shall not be
liable for an incorrect determination made in good faith. Such a
standard hardly protects the incompetent patient, since a surrogate decisionmaker is unlikely to objectively manifest any impropriety in the presence of the treating professionals. Additionally,
the court has apparently overlooked the possibility of a self-serving decision on behalf of the health care professional. Such considerations do not seem necessary in view of all the loving, caring
people who surrounded Nancy Ellen Jobes. 47 As Justice O'Hern
recognized, however, principles of law should not be developed
upon the assumption of an intact family status. 148
There has also been concern that the Jobes decision is another step along the "slippery slope."'' 4 9 Such arguments maintain that permitting the termination of life-supporting treatment
from patients who cannot speak for themselves may eventually
lead to the involuntary euthanasia of the senile, the insane and
other physically and mentally defective patients, carried out
under the euphemistic ruse of medical treatment that is in the
patient's best interest. 50 This criticism, however, seems unjustified in light of the court's distinction between passively submitting to a fatal illness and actively hastening death.' 5 '
Additionally, since the holding in Jobes was premised upon the
146

Id. at 422, 529 A.2d at 448.

147 Id. at 419-20, 529 A.2d at 447.

Id. at 453, 529 A.2d at 464 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
See Brief and Appendix on Behalf of the National Association of Prolife
Nurses Amicus Curiae at 6-7, In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (No.
26,117).
150 See id.
151 In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665.
148

149
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patient's rights to self-determination and privacy, the involuntary
euthanasia of a patient would have to be justified in similar terms,
and the court has repeatedly stated that there is no right to com52

mit suicide. 1

In its recent decisions, the Supreme Court of NewJersey has
demonstrated its unwillingness to recognize a legal difference between artificial feeding and other types of life-sustaining medical
treatment. 53 Nonetheless, some proposed legislation would require that life-sustaining nourishment and hydration never be
withheld or withdrawn from any patient, competent or incompetent, if the result of such action would be death by starvation or
dehydration. 154 The bills also provide that since food and water
are essential human needs, they should be excluded from the
definition of life-sustaining medical treatment. 151
Although the court has invited legislation in this area,

56

it

seems that such laws would be invalidated as unconstitutional
limitations on the right to privacy as recognized by the New
Jersey and federal constitutions. Additionally, in attempting to
strike food and water from the definition of life-sustaining medical treatment, these bills focus on the incorrect aspect of artificial
feeding. Food and water in and of themselves are not medical
treatment. Similarly, air in and of itself is not medical treatment,
and it is certainly as essential to human life as food or water. The
Quinlan court, however, determined that forcing oxygen into a
patient's lungs via a respirator was a medical procedure subject
to patient refusal. It is thus difficult to discern a medical or legal
basis for maintaining that the passage of liquids and pre-digested
nutrients directly into the jejunum of the patient's small intestine
via a surgically implanted plastic tube is not medical treatment
subject to the patient's refusal.
The goals of medical treatment may be either curative (to
heal or restore health), ameliorative (to prevent additional deterioration), or palliative (to relieve pain and provide comfort).' 5 7
E.g.,John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 580, 279 A.2d
670, 672 (1971).
153 In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 413 n.9, 529 A.2d 434, 444 n.9.
154 See N.J. S.2445, 202d Leg., 1st Sess. (1986); N.J. A.2830, 202d Leg., 1st Sess.,
(1986); N.J. S.3439, 201st Leg., 2nd Sess., (1985) (reintroduced in the 1986 Session at S.1409).
155 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156 Jobes, 108 N.J. at 428, 529 A.2d at 452.
157 Brief for Amicus Curiae American College of Physicians New Jersey Chapter
at 16, In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (No. 26,041) [hereinafter
Physician's Brief].
152
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In the context of artificial feeding, these goals may be to preserve
a patient's life while attempting to identify or cure a reversible
medical condition, to sustain patients with incurable feeding
problems when they so wish, or to alleviate hunger or thirst in
patients experiencing those symptoms. 5 8 In the case of Mrs.
Jobes, the medical testimony showed that she was in a persistent
vegetative state with no hope of recovery. 59 Neurological evidence has shown that persistently vegetative patients, by the nature of their disease, are not capable of experiencing pain,
hunger or thirst.' 60 Thus the court's decision seems reasonable
from a medical standpoint, since to require continued feeding in
Mrs. Jobes situation would not further any legitimate medical
goal but only prolong the process of dying.
The very nature of a medical treatment decision mandates
that the individual's personal choice and preferences be given the
highest degree of deference. Substituted judgment, exercised
within the framework of procedural safeguards, is an effective
way of implementing the personal choice of those who are unable
to speak for themselves. The right to die cases recognize the limits of medicine and the temporality of human existence. As Justice Handler wisely observed, "[w]hen cherished values of human
dignity and personal privacy, which belong to every person living
or dying, are sufficiently transgressed by what is being done to
the individual, we should be ready to say: enough."' 6 '
Guy]. Lanza
158 Id.

159Jobes, 108 N.J. at 409, 529 A.2d at 441.
160 Physician's Brief, supra note 157, at 16.
161 In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 399, 486 A.2d 1209, 1250 (1985) (Handler, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). At 1:30 a.m. on August 7, 1987, Nancy
Ellen Jobes died at Morristown Hospital, several days after the j-tube had been
removed. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1987, § 1, at 30, col. 1. She was 32 years old. Id.

